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Abstract:   This paper focuses on the effects of a so-called ‘‘basic network” for the transport of hazardous 
materials by rail and its (dis)advantages. The basic network offers authorities an easier to use framework 
for external risk policy as well as an easier framework to analyse at the municipal level the possibilities 
for urban development and communicate risks to civilians from an external safety policy perspective. 
However, the feasibility of safety measures in accordance with the basic network must be implemented in 
the laws as it has some disadvantages. In this regard, some feasibility aspects of safety measures were 
analyzed. In this paper, we analyzed if the basic network for rail transport is a sufficient way for 
controlling risks. Besides these matters of feasibility of safety measures, there are also two challenges 
introduced in this paper. First of all, safety integrated design engineering in which safety measures are 
integrated in the functional and structural building design of in the vicinity. Safety integrated design 
engineering makes it possible to save costs and to make both activities - transport of hazardous materials 
and urban development adjacent to these transport routes - possible. Secondly, some suggestions were 
made in which the focus on other rules and institutions must be instead of trying to find loopholes in the 
present rules for external safety.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Every policy is based on a set of basic assumptions. In the social sciences these policy assumptions are 
often referred to with the concept of ‘policy theory’. A policy theory can be defined as the whole of 
hypotheses and assumptions combined that underlie a certain policy [1]. These policy theories are 
something different than scientific theories on policy, and involve the reconstruction of the assumptions of 
policy makers. These assumptions of policy makers could even regard to social aspects - such as the 
behavior of persons or groups-, but also to the functioning of organizations or to economical aspects of 
policy. These assumptions often concern causal relations (cause and effect relations) and final relations 
(goal and means relations). Apart from these relations, normative relations are also important in policy 
theories. These relations are based on (political) principles, norms and values on the one hand and 
expected, existing or intended situations on the other and are also called institutions. According to North: 
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction”. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” [2].
Daily interactions between policy actors are assumed to gradually develop into more or less stable 
patterns, which may also include the substantive delineation of the problem at stake and its possible 
solutions. This could also involve, however, the processes between the actors and the formal and informal 
rules according to which these processes take place. These processes are usually referred to as 
institutionalism [3]. In the Netherlands, balancing the transport of hazardous materials on one hand and 
urban development adjacent to these transport routes on the other, the external safety policy is created to 
control risks. 
One may expect that such a policy may also take both the formal and informal institutions into account. 
However, this is not always the case and in case that these are considered there is no streamlined policy 
which promotes an easier and rational decision-making process. 
A shortage of land across the Netherlands has also led to the development of design and construction 
techniques that enables intensive use of the limited space. In the last decade, the space available adjacent 
to and above the transport infrastructure - particularly railway tracks - has been used at a growing rate in 
city centers. In addition, line infrastructure for transport of hazardous materials is mostly also in use for 
passenger transport and therefore often crosses densely populated urban areas. The new development 
strategies of the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment regarding space in urban 
areas pay special attention to these issues. However, the Dutch spatial planning policy, which aims to 
intensify the use of space [4], may come into conflict with the intentions set out in the Fourth National 
Environmental Policy Plan, which states that additional (open) space is sometimes necessary to guarantee 
external safety [5]. All these processes are institutionalizations of risk mitigation strategies. In the 
following, we will see whether or not the plans for a ‘basic network’ for rail transport is a sufficient way 
for controlling risks, or that it has some flaws to overcome. We will argue that the way institutions are 
designed and used is reflected in the level of risk. Furthermore, this paper is meant to shed some light in 
one of the key plans by the Dutch authorities to control transport risks concerning the rail transport of 
hazardous materials by designing and implementing institutions for the basic network.
2  INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSPORT RISKS
In the Netherlands, regulations for land-use planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazards are 
explicitly risk-based. This implies that potential adverse physical effects of incident scenarios are 
considered along with their probability of occurrence and their possible impacts. One of the main reasons 
for implementing the risk policy is a shortage of space, as a result of which the optimal space according to 
the effect distance of a worst case scenario between a risk generating activity and urban development 
cannot be achieved. Three main elements constitute the Dutch regulatory risk framework. These elements 
are: (i) quantitative risk assessment, (ii) the adoption of individual and group risk as risk-determining 
parameters and (iii) acceptability criteria for individual and group risk. Basically, risk consists of three 
components: the scenario, the probability of this scenario and the consequence of the scenario [6]. Risk is 
described in the Dutch policy practice as the formula: the probability of an accident multiplied by its 
effect. This is therefore the most frequently used definition in Dutch risk analysis. 
Safety measures are implemented to increase safety levels to a certain level. There are several measures 
that can be implemented against critical scenarios in such projects. Risk assessment consists of the use of 
all available information to estimate the risk to individuals or populations, the environment or property 
from identified hazards and compares this with targets and search for solutions [7]. In risk assessment, 
generally some effort is made regarding scenario development, whereas most emphasis is put on 
frequency analysis and risk calculation [8]. In this respect, risk management is the application of risk 
information as an integrated part of the management process, including interaction with external bodies 
[9].
In order to reduce the risks concerning the transport of hazardous materials by rail within the boundaries
of the risk criteria, technical measures are generally taken. For example, if the risk exceeds the norm on a 
certain location, measures taken are for example the decreasing the maximum speed, removing track-
changes from a certain part of the railway track or preventing the dispersion of hazardous substances [10]. 
These technical measures then reduce the risk of transport with respect to urban planning, due to the fact 
that either the probability variable or the effect variable (or, of course, both) are lowered. In practice, 
however, still problems occur with this more technical approach as the norms that are set for this so-called 
External Safety Policy are exceeded in several cases [5,11].
3  NEW INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF THE BASIC NETWORK
The so-called Basic Network for the transport routes of hazardous materials was recently launched by the 
Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. In fact, the Basic Network focuses on 
transport routes by road, railway and water. However, considering the scope of this paper, as mentioned 
before, we will focus on the railway track. The basic network categorizes the total amount of transport of 
hazardous materials by rail, measured in tank wagons, for the current and future railway tracks in the 
Netherlands. In this regard, a first elaboration on the basic network is given by the Mobility Policy 
Document (‘Nota Mobiliteit’, [12]). The Mobility Policy Document states that the government is to create 
a basic network which consists ofthree types of routes with different importance to either spatial 
development or transport. Also, along the basic network a safety zone will be created within which 
limitations to certain activities will be set. A distinction is made between three main categories for 
transport of hazardous materials, with a different value of importance to either transport of hazardous 
materials or spatial development. 
 Primary routes with unlimited transport of hazardous materials. Urban development has large 
limitations due to safety zoning;
 Secondary routes where transport of hazardous materials as well as urban development have their 
limitations;
 Tertiary routes on which transport of hazardous materials is limited and next to which urban 
development should not be hindered at all.
Allowed amount of tank wagons transported 
per year:
Type of the transported 
hazardous material
Hazard Identification 
Numbers 
(Kemler Codes) Category 2A 
railways
Category 2B 
railways
Category 3A 
railways
Flammable gasses
(Matter category A)
23, 263, 239 12500 2500 350
Toxic gasses
(Matter category B2)
26, 265, 268 (except for 
UN 1017, Chloride gas)
6600 5400 1250
Highly toxic gasses
(Matter category B3)
268 (in this case UN 
1017, Chloride gas)
0 200 0
Highly flammable liquids
(Matter category C3)
33, 33*, X33, 336 
(except for UN 1093, 
Acrylonitril).
5000 4000 1250
Toxic liquids
(Matter category D3)
336 (in this case UN 
1093, Acrylonitril).
15500 6300 1200
Highly toxic liquids
(Matter category D4)
66, 663, 668, 886, X88, 
X886
1500 750 750
Table 1: Maximum allowed quantities transported on railway tracks per year per category for the Basic Network [14]
In November 2005, the Note Transport of Hazardous Materials was sent for approval to the House of 
Representatives by the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management [13]. In this Note, the 
names for the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary routes changed into Category 1, 2 and 3 routes.
In the concept version of 12 December 2005 of the Decision on the routing of the transport of hazardous 
materials by rail (‘Besluit routering vervoer over de spoorweg van gevaarlijke stoffen’), a new distinction 
is made in five categories (Category 1, 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B) [14]. The idea behind this distinction is still 
the same as in the Mobility Policy Document, but now the nature and volume of hazardous materials to be 
transported is more specified. Category 1 and Category 3B are the extreme categories. For Category 1 
railways there is still no limitation as to the nature and amount of hazardous materials transported. The 
category 3B railways are free from transport of hazardous materials. 
These quantities form one of two central principles for the basic network, which is the ‘user space’. For 
the categories 2A, 2B and 3A, the following limitations are given:
The combination of these principles, limiting volumes and the Dutch railroad network results in a map 
with the qualified railway tracks. Subsequently, the entire railway infrastructure in the Netherlands forms 
the basic network (see Figure 1). Thus, all the Dutch railways are part of the basic network.
Figure 1: Map of the Netherlands with the corresponding railroad categories (based on [14])
The other central principle of the basic network is safety zoning. This means that a static safety zone is 
created where no vulnerable objects may be built. Examples of vulnerable objects are hospitals, homes or 
schools, since the self rescue of people inside such objects is relatively low. This zone is assumed to be 
three dimensional. Therefore constructions cannot cover the rail infrastructure, except for when the 
infrastructure is strengthened to withstand large explosions. The safety zoning is mainly meant for the 
category one railroads and is based on a pool fire, which has a maximum reach of about thirty meters. 
Hence, the safety zone for category 1 railroads is set to be thirty meters. For category 2 railroads, a smaller 
zone should be established according to the Note Transport of Hazardous Materials [13]. In case an 
increase of the Group Risk is expected near category one or two railroads, a ‘consideration’ should be 
made on external safety and the development plan up to a zone of 200 meters from the rail track. Beyond 
this zone there are, in theory, no limitations for spatial development.
4  FEASIBILITY OF THE MEASURES
The Basic Network has advantages as well as disadvantages (for an overview see [15]. It is however the 
question whether these newly developed plans are able to become institutionalized into new policies or 
legislation. Questions arise surrounding the feasibility of the network and the expected transport figures. 
The questions surrounding the feasibility are based on the following points of concern:
1) International institutions (directives, legislation) form the starting point for the basic network:
International laws and directives such as the free transport of goods directive and the ‘Accord européen 
relatif au transport international des marchandises Dangereuses par Route’ (ADR) and the  ‘Regulations 
concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail’ (RID). These institutions are of 
course very important for regulating transport and making transport safer. However, especially the free 
transport of goods directive is of concern when it comes to safety. Due to this directive, transporters are 
free to transport their goods from place A to B for international transport. Routing is only possible when 
authorities have a sufficient alternative and have taken counter measures [16].
2) Market expectations on which the basic network is based are already out of date:
In a recently published market expectation (December 2007), the rail network administrator, Prorail, came 
with future transport figures for the period until the year 2020. These transport figures are actualized 
numbers for the so-called ‘policy free market prognosis 2003’. The latter forms the basis for the transport 
ceilings on which the routes of the basic network are based. At first, it seemed that the transport ceilings 
were much higher than the market prognosis of 2003 deemed necessary. However, the actualized market 
prognosis of 2007 now shows even higher numbers than the transport numbers on which the basic 
network is based. It would lead to too much detail to prove this point by picking out all the places on the 
network. A quick reference is, we think, sufficient for making this point by using the flammable gasses as 
an example.
The Brabantroute is a transport and passenger route in the southern part of the Netherlands (for more 
information see [17]) and due to a number of problems with high risks categorized as a 2B route on Figure 
1. Table 1 shows that this means that not more than 2500 wagons of flammable gasses may pass here. 
However, the minimum expectation for this route in the future is 11260 wagons, with a maximum of 
14110. Even if this transport route is categorized as a 2B freight category, this could lead to an 
institutional problem even before the basic network is taken into use. This leads to a paradox, which is that 
the responsible Ministry forms new policy that could already be outdated before it is even implemented.
This also leads to another problem.
3) Group risk considerations should still be made:
Due to the fact that Group Risk considerations should still be made for category 2 and 3 railroads, a 
problem arises when the transport figures increase so drastically. Due to the way risks are modeled, an 
increase in the transport of hazardous materials leads to a higher risk as the probability of a disaster 
increases. When a local authority wants to develop its territory near a transport route, it also increases risk 
(if there are more people present near the transport route) due to a higher possible effect. There is, 
however, a problem. Due to the European directives, there are hardly any limits to transport of hazardous 
materials. Hence, transporting parties are allowed to freely transport there materials through the territory 
of local authorities. Local authorities, however, cannot freely develop their territory as they need to meet 
with the rules surrounding the Group Risk criterion. At present, this is of course also the case. Due to the 
foreseen increase of transport however, this will become much more difficult than it even is at present.
4) Permanent amelioration of safety is not embedded in the decision-making process:
A much heard complaint of transporting parties is that they meet all the European safety standards and still 
need to do more about the safety of their packaging materials. Besides this complaint, it is also very 
difficult to meet higher standards without doing damage to the competitive position of the transport 
parties. When a national government demands higher safety standards this could be contradictory to the 
European directives. Also, the costs for the implementation of measures are only necessary for a small 
part of the covering area of the wagons. As wagons travel throughout the whole of Europe, extra demands 
for safety are only necessary for the national territory of the Netherlands.
5  CHALLENGES
Besides these matters of feasibility, there are also two challenges that should be taken into account before 
the basic network is taken into use. 
First of all, Suddle [18] introduced a new way of dealing with external safety problems in relation with 
urban development. He suggests to integrate the safety measures in the functional and structural design of 
(the buildings in) the vicinity, in order to save costs and to make both activities - transport of hazardous 
materials and urban development adjacent to these transport routes - possible. Especially safety measures 
to buildings adjacent to transport routes with hazardous materials can be integrated in the safety zone (see 
an example hereof in Figure 2 [18]). 
Figure 2: An example of safety integrated design engineering [18].
However, there is less knowledge in literature on this safety integrated design engineering. Some literature 
can be found on this topic, see e.g. [10, 19]. Furthermore, the risk reducing effect per measure has to be 
compared with the investments in that measure, because of efficiency considerations. 
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In this regard, the cost effectiveness of the safety measures is an important issue in safety integrated 
design engineering. When focussing on the Basic Network, safety integrated design engineering must be 
integrated in the development hereof, in order to implement such measures more effectively and on basis 
of law. Besides this, it also makes the group risk considerations much easier and legitimate, in which 
proper solutions are considered in the decision-making process. This methodology can support the 
decision-makers in a broader sense. Without these indications, it is difficult for decision-makers to decide 
rationally.
Secondly, there should be a focus on other rules and institutions instead of trying to find loopholes in the 
present rules. In earlier research done by the Dutch Institute for Public Health and the Environment [20] 
asked for a more rational approach to risks. Van der Vlies [21] made clear that the risks are not to be 
exaggerated when it comes to transporting hazardous materials by rail. In this respect, it is not strange that 
other suggestions are made surrounding possibilities for a new institutional framework [22]. Therefore, the 
whole present framework should be critically looked at to see whether or not it sufficient for the present 
and the future in transport.
6  CONCLUSION
Institutions determine how actors in a policy field can behave. In this paper we have presented a new 
policy goal by the Dutch Minstry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management for controlling risks 
surrounding the transport of hazardous materials by rail. We have argued that this framework has 
problems surrounding the feasibility. Also we have shown that there are challenges to overcome, before 
the Basic Network can serve as a real solution for risk problems. Therefore, we suggest that before the 
Basic Network will be an act of law, the responsible authorities take a really good second look at it. 
Otherwise, the risk of the Basic Network being superseded within the first few years that it is functional is 
too great. In order to make the basic network more useful for both the transport of hazardous materials and 
urban development, particular solutions, such as safety integrated design engineering, should be a judicial 
part of the basic network. This enables proper solutions to external safety policy and a streamlined rational 
decision making as well. 
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